Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2017

Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their
Regulation Under International Law
Kenneth Anderson
ANDERS@WCL.AMERICAN.EDU

Matthew C. Waxman
Columbia Law School, mwaxma@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace
Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and
Their Regulation Under International Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY,
ROGER BROWNSWORD, ELOISE SCOTFORD & KAREN YEUNG, EDS., OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017; AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2017-21; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER
NO. 14-553 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2037

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

American University Washington College of Law
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2017-21

DEBATING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS, THEIR ETHICS, AND THEIR
REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Kenneth Anderson
Matthew C. Waxman

This paper can be downloaded without charge from
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 25 2017, NEWGEN

Chapter 45

DEBATING AUTONOMOUS
WEAPON SYSTEMS, THEIR
ETHICS, AND THEIR
REGULATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Kenneth Anderson
and Matthew C. Waxman

1. Introduction
In November 2012, a high-profile public debate over the law and ethics of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) was kicked off by the release of two quite different
documents by two quite different organizations.
The first of these is a policy memorandum on AWS issued by the US Department
of Defense (DOD), under signature of then-Deputy Secretary of Defense (today
Secretary of Defense) Ashton B Carter: the DOD Directive: Autonomy in Weapon
Systems) (DOD Directive 2012). The Directive’s fundamental purposes are, first,
to establish DOD policy regarding the ‘development and use of autonomous and
semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems’ and, second, to establish DOD
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‘guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended
engagements’ (DOD Directive 2012: 1).
The Directive defines terms of art, and in particular the meaning of ‘autonomous’ and ‘semi-autonomous’ with respect to weapons and targeting in the
international law of armed conflict (LOAC)—the body of international law, also
known as international humanitarian law, regulating the conduct of warfare (DOD
Directive 2012: 13–15). As a policy directive, it provides special requirements for
AWS that might now or in the future be in development. But its substance draws
upon long-standing DOD understandings of policy, law, and regulation of weapons development—understandings premised, in the Directive’s language, on the
requirement that AWS be designed to ‘allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force’ (DOD Directive
2012: 2).
The gradual increase in the automation of weapon systems by the US military
(taking the long historical view) stretches back at least to World War II and the
early development of crude, mechanical feedback devices to improve the aim of
anti-aircraft guns. Efforts to increase weapon automation are nothing new for the
United States or the military establishments of other leading states. The Directive
represents (for DOD, at least) an incremental step in policy guidance with respect
to the processes for incorporating automation technologies of many kinds into
weapon systems, including concerns about legality in particular battlefield uses,
and training to ensure proper and effective use by its human operators. But the
Directive’s fundamental assumption (indeed DOD’s fundamental assumption about
all US military technologies) is that, in general, automation technologies will, and
should, continue to be built into many new and existing weapon systems. While the
Directive emphasizes practical and evolving policies to minimize risks and contingencies that any particular system might pose in any particular setting, it takes for
granted that of course advancing automation, even to the point of ‘autonomy’ in
some circumstances, is a legitimate aim in weapons design.
That assumption, however, is precisely what comes under challenge by a second high-profile document. It is a report and public call to action (also issued
in November 2012) by the well-known international human rights organization,
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots.
Its release was coordinated with, and the basis for, the launch of an international
NGO campaign under the name Stop Killer Robots (2013). This new campaign
draws on the now familiar model of the 1990s campaign to ban antipersonnel
landmines. The Stop Killer Robots coalition, with HRW at its core and Losing
Humanity as its manifesto, called in the most sweeping terms for a complete, preemptive ban on the development, production, transfer or sale, or use of any ‘fully
autonomous’ AWS. It called for an international treaty to enact this sweeping,
pre-emptive ban.
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Losing Humanity is thus not primarily about debating DOD over the optimal
prudent policies and legal interpretations to ensure that today’s emerging weapon
systems would be lawful in one battlefield setting or another. Rather (as this chapter discusses in sections 3 and 4), Losing Humanity asserts flatly that on its initial assessment, AWS—now or in the future, and no matter how advanced artificial
intelligence (AI) might one day become—will not be able to comply with the
requirements of LOAC. It is a remarkable claim, as critics of the report (including
the present authors) have noted, because it contains sweeping assumptions about
what technology will be capable of far into the future.
Today’s international advocacy campaign, seeking a total, pre-emptive ban treaty,
paints a dire picture of future warfare if current trends toward automation and artificial intelligence in weapon systems are not nipped in the bud today. Advocates
make bold claims, implicitly or explicitly, about the future capabilities and limits
of technology. And, deploying tropes from popular culture and science fiction (the
catch-phrase ‘Killer Robots,’ to start with), this public advocacy urges that the way
to prevent a future in which Killer Robots slip beyond human control is to enact
today a complete ban on AWS.
Largely as a result of the Losing Humanity report and the coalition to Stop Killer
Robots campaign, AWS and debates over its normative regulation, whether by a ban
or something else, have been taken up by some states and United Nations officials at
various UN forums. Beginning in 2013, several expert meetings on AWS have been
convened under the aegis of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW 1980). Debate over the appropriate application of international law to AWS
is far from static, however, and it is likely that positions and views by one actor or
another in the international community that loom large today will have shifted even
by the time this chapter reaches print.
The two foundational documents from 2012, viewed together, represent two main
positions in today’s debate over AWS: regulate AWS in ways already required in
LOAC, on the one hand, or enact a complete ban on them, on the other. While
other, more nuanced positions are emerging in the CCW meetings, these two represent major, fundamental legal alternatives. Yet the debate between these two has
a certain ‘ships passing in the night’ quality to it; the DOD Directive is about practical, current technological R&D, while HRW’s call for a total pre-emptive ban is
grounded in considerable part on predictions about the long run. The ‘risks’ that
each position sees in AWS are thus very different from each other, and likewise are
the forms of norms and regulation that each side believes addresses those risks.
Although some intellectual leaders of the debate have gone some distance over the
last three years in bridging these conceptual gaps, at some fundamental level gaps
are likely always to remain. It bears noting, however—in a Handbook about not
just weapons and war, but about emerging technologies and their regulation more
broadly—that many aspects of the AWS debate arise in other debates, over other
technologies of automation, autonomy, and artificial intelligence.
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a basic overview of the current normative
debates over AWS, as well as the processes through which these debates are taking
place at national and international levels.

2. What is an AWS and Why Are
They Militarily Useful?
The DOD Directive defines an AWS as a ‘weapon system that, once activated,
can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator’. The Directive goes on to define a ‘semi-autonomous weapon system’ as
one that ‘once activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator’ (DOD Directive
2012: 13–14). Losing Humanity defines a ‘fully autonomous weapon’ as either
(a) a weapon system in which human operators are ‘out-of-the-loop,’ meaning
that the machine is ‘capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any
human input or interaction’; or (b) a weapon system in which human operators
are ‘on-the-loop,’ meaning that, in principle, a human operator is able to override the machine’s target selection and engagement, but in practical fact, the
human operators are ‘out-of-the-loop’ because mechanisms of supervision are
so limited (Losing Humanity 2012: 2). These definitions of AWS differ in certain
important ways, but they share a common view of what makes a weapon system
‘autonomous’: it is a matter of whether a human operator realistically is able to
override an activated machine in the core targeting functions of target selection
and engagement.
In a highly abstract sense, any weapon that does not require a human operator
could be regarded as an AWS. Antipersonnel landmines would be a simple example
of a weapon that is triggered without a human operator in-the-loop or on-the-loop,
but instead is triggered by pressure or movement. Conceptually, at least, such mines
might fit the definition of autonomy. This is so, however, only if ‘select’ is construed
to mean merely ‘triggered,’ rather than ‘selection among’ targets. ‘Selection among’
emphasizes that there is a machine-generated targeting decision made; some form
of computational cognition, meaning some form of AI or logical reasoning, is inherently part of AWS in the contemporary debate. The debates over what constitutes an
AWS leaves aside weapons, such as landmines, that are conceptually ‘autonomous’
merely because they are so technologically unsophisticated that that they cannot be
aimed, and we leave those aside as well. AWS in today’s debates refer to technologically sophisticated systems in which capabilities for ‘selection among’ is a specific
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design aim for the weapon, and in which the machine possesses some decisional
capability to ‘select’ and ‘engage.’
A feature of the above definitions of AWS, however, is that they are essentially
categorical: a weapon is or is not autonomous. If so, this would certainly make
regulation of AWS easier. But the practical reality is that the line between ‘highly
automated’ and ‘autonomous’ is not clear-cut. Rather, ‘automation’ describes a
continuum, and there are various ways to define places along it. Terms like ‘semiautonomous,’ ‘human-in-the-loop’ and ‘human-on-the-loop’ are used to convey
different levels and configurations of machine-human interaction and degrees of
independent machine decision-making. Autonomy is not just about machine capabilities, but instead about the capabilities and limitations of both machines and
human operators, interacting together. Rather than debate categorical definitions, a
better starting point is that new autonomous systems will develop incrementally as
more functions (not just of the weapon but also of the platform, e.g. the vehicle or
aircraft) are automated. Incremental increases in automation will alter the humanmachine interaction, and ‘functional’ autonomy (whether believed to be good or
bad) will have to be assessed on a detailed examination of each system, case-by-case,
assessing machine functions, human operator functions, and how they interact.
This continuum offers many possible gradations of automation, autonomy, and
human operator control. For example, ‘intermediate’ automation of weapon systems might pre-program the machine to look for certain enemy weapon signatures
and to alert a human operator of the threat, who then decides whether or not to
pull the trigger. At a further level of automation, the system might be set so that a
human operator does not have to give an affirmative command, but instead merely
decides whether to override and veto a machine-initiated attack. Perhaps next in
the gradation of automation, the system would be designed with the capability to
select a target and engage autonomously—but also programmed to wait and call
for human authorization if it identifies the presence of civilians or alternatively,
more sophisticated yet (perhaps into the level of science fiction, perhaps not) programmed to assess possible collateral damage and not engage if it is estimated to be
above a certain level.
In some cases, a human operator might control only a single or very few sets of
sensor and weapon units. In others, he or she might control or oversee an integrated
network of many sensor and weapon units, which might operate largely autonomously, though with the supervisor able to intervene with respect to any of the
weapon units. In still other cases, the move to automate the weapon system (or
even give it autonomy) might be driven by automation of all the other non-weapon
systems of the platform with which the weapon has to be coordinated (including
the ability to operate at the same speed at which the rest of the platform operates).
Eventually, these systems may reach the point of full autonomy for which, once
activated, the human role is vanishingly small (functionally out-of-the-loop, even
if technically on-the-loop), and it may depend heavily on the operators’ training
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and orders from higher commanders. The tipping point from a highly automated
system to an ‘autonomous’ one is thus very thin, a continuum rather than distinct
categories, a function of both machine and human parameters together and, in
practice, an unstable dividing line as technology moves forward.
It is important to be clear as to what kinds of highly automated or even autonomous weapons exist today. Weapon systems that would be able to assess civilian
status or estimate harm as part of their own independent targeting decisions do not
exist today and research toward such capabilities currently remains in the realm of
theory (see Arkin 2009). That said, several modern highly automated—and some
would call them autonomous—weapon systems already exist. These are generally
for use in battlefield environments such as naval encounters at sea where risks to
civilians are small, and are generally limited to defensive contexts against other
machines in which human operators activate and monitor the system and can override its operation. The US Patriot and Aegis anti-missile systems and Israel’s Iron
Dome anti-missile system are both leading examples, but they will not remain the
only ones (See Schmitt and Thurnher 2013 explaining existing types of sophisticated
highly automated or autonomous weapon systems). New autonomous weapon systems are gradually becoming incorporated into warfare as technology advances and
capabilities increase, one small, automated step at a time.
Increasing automation in weapons technology results from advances in sensor
and analytical capabilities and their integration into—and especially in response
to the increasing tempo of—military operations. Some of this technology is highly
particular to military battlefield requirements, but much of it is simply a military
application of a new technology that finds wide uses in general society. For example,
as private automobiles gradually incorporate new automation technologies—
perhaps even a genuinely self-driving car—it would be inconceivable that military
technologies would not incorporate them as well. This is no less true in the case of
the targeting functions of weapons as for other weapon system functions, such as
navigation or flying. Put another way, the ability to apply robotic systems to military functions depends upon advances and innovations in all the areas necessary
to robotics—sensors, computational cognition and decision-making analytics, and
physical movement and action mechanisms that make the machine robotic rather
than a mere computer.
Increasing automation has other drivers, specific to the military, such as the desire
among political leaders to protect not just one’s own personnel on the battlefield
but also civilian persons and property. Nonetheless, although automation will be a
general feature across battlefield environments and weapon systems, genuine, full
autonomy in weapons will likely remain rare for the foreseeable future, save in situations where special need justifies the expense and burden of weapons development.
What are some of these special battlefield needs? A central and unsurprising one is
the increasing tempo of military operations in which, other things being equal, the
faster system wins the engagement (Marra and McNeil 2012). Automation permits
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military systems of all kinds, not just weapons, to act more quickly than people
might be able to do, in order to assess, calculate, and respond to a threat.
Moreover, speed, whether achieved through increased automation or genuine
autonomy, might sometimes serve to make the deployment of force in battle more
precise. By shortening the time, for example, between the positive identification of
a target and its attack, there is less likelihood that the situation might have changed,
that the target may have moved, or that civilians might have come into proximity.
In the Libya hostilities in 2011, NATO-manned attack aircraft were reportedly too
slow and had too little loiter time to permit accurate targeting of highly mobile
vehicles on the ground in an urban battlefield with many civilians. In response, an
appeal was made to the United States to initially supply surveillance drones, and
then armed drones that could speed up the targeting process.1 Some version of this
will drive demand for automation, especially in competition with a sophisticated
enemy’s technology.

3. AWS Under the Existing Law
of Armed Conflict
A peculiarity of the existing debates over AWS since 2012 is that some participants
and certainly many ordinary observers appear to believe that AWS are not currently governed by existing international law, or at least not by a sufficiently robust
body of international law. This misimpression lends greater weight and urgency to
the call for some new law to address them, whether in the form of a ban treaty or a
new protocol to the CCW. This is not the case, however; AWS of any kind—indeed,
all weapons—are subject to LOAC. A requirement of LOAC is that states conduct
legal reviews of weapons to determine if they are lawful weapons based on certain
longstanding baseline requirements; if there are any legal restrictions on the battlefield environments for which they are lawful; or if there any legal limitations on how
they can be used (see Thurnher 2013 for a non-technical exposition of these requirements). This matters because, despite the attention garnered by both the NGO campaign for a ban and demands for a new CCW protocol on AWS, there is already a
robust legal process for the legal review of weapons.
Additionally, all the law of targeting and other fundamental rules of LOAC already
apply to AWS, any form of automated weapon or any other form of weapon. Indeed,
there are very few types of weapons, such as chemical weapons, that are governed by
their own special set of international treaty rules. That sort of specialized regulation
is the exception, not the rule. The vast majority of weapon systems—and the use of

oxfordhb-9780199680832_Part-5.indd 1103

4/25/2017 7:03:10 PM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 25 2017, NEWGEN

1104

kenneth anderson and matthew c. waxman

those systems—are regulated by a well-established body of law that applies broadly,
including to any new weapons that are invented.
There is a belief among some LOAC experts, perhaps particularly among LOAC
lawyers in DOD and some other ministries of defence, that the whole debate over
AWS has somehow got off on the wrong foot since 2012, with an assumption that
this is legally ungoverned or only lightly governed space and therefore something
must put in place. These LOAC lawyers might prefer to begin by asking what is
wrong with the status quo of LOAC and its requirements, as they apply to AWS,
now and in the future? And in what way has the existing process of legal weapons review been shown to be so inadequate that it needs to be replaced or supplemented by additional legal requirements—particularly given that for the most part,
these remain future weapons with many unknown issues of design and performance? While it is certainly true, and recognized by LOAC lawyers, that legal weapon
review of highly automated systems will require earlier review and legal guidance at
the design stage, and quite possibly new forms of testing and verification of systems
at a very granular level of a weapon system’s engineering and software, in what way
has the current system of legal review and regulation failed?
According to HRW, a weapon system that meets the definition of ‘full autonomy’
is inherently or inevitably illegal under LOAC. Losing Humanity states
initial evaluation of fully autonomous weapons shows … such robots would appear to be
incapable of abiding by key principles of international humanitarian law. They would be
unable to follow the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity … Full
autonomy would strip civilians of protections from the effects of war that are guaranteed
under the law (2012: 1–2).

Many LOAC experts—ourselves included—disagree that this is so as a matter of
existing legal principle; the question, rather, is to examine any particular system
and assess whether, and to what extent, it is, in fact, able to satisfy the requirements
of LOAC in a given battlefield environment.2 LOAC experts such as ourselves see
arguments for a pre-emptive ban (or even greatly strengthened restrictions in a
CCW protocol), moreover, as making of new law, not merely interpreting existing
law, and doing so on the basis of certain factual predictions about the future of technology and how far it might advance in sophistication over the long-run. To understand this difference in perspectives, it is necessary to understand the basics of the
existing LOAC framework (see Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman 2014, for a details
discussion of these legal requirements as applied to AWS).
The legality of weapon systems turns on three fundamental rules. First, the
weapon system cannot be indiscriminate by nature. This is not to ask whether
there might be circumstances in which the weapon could not be aimed in a way
that would comply with the legal requirement of ‘distinction’ between lawful military targets and civilians. That would be true of nearly any weapon, because any
weapon could be deliberately misused. Rather, the rule runs to the nature of the
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weapon in the uses for which it was designed or, as some authorities have put it,
its ‘normal’ uses, i.e. the uses for which it was intended. This sets a very high
bar for showing a weapon to be illegal as such; very few weapons are illegal per
se, because they are indiscriminate by nature. The much more common problem
arises when legal weapons are used in an indiscriminate manner—a serious violation of the law of armed conflict, certainly, but one that concerns the actual use
of a weapon.
Second, a lawful weapon system cannot be ‘of a nature’ to cause ‘unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury’. This provision aims to protect combatants from
needless or inhumane suffering, such as shells filled with glass shards that would
not be detectable by an x-ray of the wound. It is a rule that applies solely to combatants, not civilians (who are protected by other law of armed conflict provisions).
Like the ‘indiscriminate by nature’ rule, it sets a high bar; this is unsurprising, given
the many broad forms of violence that can lawfully be inflicted upon combatants in
armed conflict.
Third, a weapon system can be deemed illegal per se if the harmful effects of
the weapon are not capable of being ‘controlled’. The rule against weapons with
uncontrollable harmful effects is paradigmatically biological weapons, in which a
virus or other biological agent cannot be controlled or contained; once released, it
goes where it goes. Once again, even though many LOAC rules prevent the use of
weapons in circumstances that might have uncontrolled effects, the bar to make the
weapon itself illegal per se is high.
There is debate on this point, but many LOAC experts—including the authors of
this chapter—believe that these rules do not render a weapon system illegal per se
solely on account of it being autonomous (Schmitt and Thurnher 2013: 279, discussing that ‘autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful per se’). Even if a weapon
system is not per se illegal, however, it might still be prohibited in some—even
most—battlefield environments, or in particular uses on a particular battlefield.
But in other circumstances, the weapon might also be legal. With respect to new
weapon technologies generally, the question is not whether the ‘new technologies
are good or bad in themselves, but instead what are the circumstances for their use’
(ICRC 2011: 40).
Targeting law governs the circumstances of the use of lawful weapons and
includes three fundamental rules: discrimination (or distinction), proportionality,
and precautions in attack (see Boothby 2012 for a standard reference work with
respect to targeting law). Distinction requires that a combatant, using reasonable
judgment in the circumstances, distinguish between combatants and civilians, as
well as between military and civilian objects. Although use of autonomous weapon
systems is not illegal per se, a requirement for their lawful use—the ability to distinguish lawful from un-lawful targets—might vary enormously from one weapon
system’s technology to another. Some algorithms, sensors, or analytic capabilities
might perform well, others poorly.
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Such capabilities are measured with respect to particular uses in particular battlefield environments; the ‘context and environment in which the weapon system
operates play a significant role in this analysis’ (Thurnher 2013). Air-to-air combat
between military aircraft over the open ocean, for example, might one day take
place between autonomous systems, as a result of the technological pressures for
greater speed, ability to endure torque and inertial pressures, and so on. Distinction
is highly unlikely to be an issue in that particular operational environment, however, because the combat environment would be lacking in civilians. Yet, there
would be many operational environments in which meeting the requirements of
distinction by a fully autonomous system would be very difficult—urban battlefield
environments in which civilians and combatants are commingled, for example. This
is not to say that autonomous systems are thereby totally illegal. Quite the opposite,
in fact, as in some settings their use would be legal and in others illegal, depending
on how technologies advance.
Proportionality requires that the reasonably anticipated military advantage of an
operation be weighed against the reasonably anticipated civilian harms. As with the
principle of distinction, there are operational settings—air-to-air combat over open
water, tank warfare in remote uninhabited deserts, ship antimissile defence, undersea anti-submarine operations, for example—in which civilians are not likely to be
present and which, in practical terms, do not require very much complex weighing
of military advantage against civilian harms. Conversely, in settings such as urban
warfare, proportionality is likely to pose very difficult conditions for machine programming, and it is widely recognized that whether and how such systems might
one day be developed is simply an open question.
Precautions in attack require that an attacking party take feasible precautions
in the circumstances to spare the civilian population. Precautions and feasibility,
it bears stressing, however, are terms of art in the law of armed conflict that confer
reasonable discretion on commanders undertaking attacks. The commander’s obligation is grounded in reasonableness and good faith, and in ‘planning, deciding
upon or executing attacks, the decision taken by the person responsible has to be
judged on the basis of all information available to him at the relevant time, and not
on the basis of hindsight.’
In applying these rules to AWS, it is essential to understand that before an AWS—
like any weapon system, including highly-automated or autonomous ones—is used
in a military operation, human commanders and operators employing it generally
will continue to be expected to exercise caution and judgment about such things
as the likely presence of civilians and the possibility that they may be inadvertently
injured or killed; expected military advantage; particular environmental conditions or features; the weapon’s capabilities, limitations, and safety features; as well
as many other factors. The many complex legal issues involved in such scenarios
make it hard to draw general conclusions in the abstract. In many cases, however,
although a weapon system may be autonomous, much of the requisite legal analysis
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would still be conducted by human decision makers who must choose whether or
not to use it in a specific situation. Whether LOAC legal requirements are satisfied
in a given situation will therefore depend not simply on the machine’s own programming and technical capabilities, but also on human judgments.
In the end, at least in the view of some LOAC experts, there is no reason in
principle why a highly automated or autonomous system could not satisfy the
requirements of targeting law (Schmitt and Thurnher 2013: 279). How likely it
is that it will do so in fact is an open question—indeed, as leading AI robotics
researcher Ronald Arkin says, it should be treated as a hypothesis to be proved
or disproved by attempts to build machines able to do so (Arkin 20143). In practical terms, however, weapon systems capable of full or semi-autonomy, and yet
lacking the capacity to follow all the LOAC rules, could still find an important
future role, insofar as they are set with a highly restrictive set of parameters on
both target selection and engagement. For example, an AWS could be set with
parameters far more restrictive than those required by law; instead of proportionality, it could be set not to fire if it detects any civilian presence. Being an
AWS does not mean, in other words, that it cannot be used unless it is capable of following the LOAC rules entirely on its own. As participants in the
AWS are gradually coming to recognize, the real topic of debate is not AWS set
loose on battlefield somewhere, but instead the regulation of machine-human
interactions.

4. Substantive Arguments for a
Pre-emptive Ban on AWS
Although the existing legal framework that governs AWS and any other weapon
system AWS is primarily LOAC and its weapons review process (and some other
bodies of law, such as human rights law, might apply in some specific contexts),
advocates of a complete ban generally advance several arguments in favour of a
complete, pre-emptive ban. Three of the most prominent are taken up in this section: (a) AWS should be banned on the pure moral principle that machines should
not make decisions to kill; this morally belongs to people, not robotic machines;
(b) machine programming and AI will never reach a point of being capable of
satisfying the requirements of LOAC, law, and ethics, and because they will not
be able to do so even in the future, they should be pre-emptively banned today;
and (c) AWS should be banned because machine decision-making undermines, or
even removes, the possibility of holding anyone accountable in the way and to the
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extent that, for example, an individual human soldier might be held accountable for
unlawful or even criminal actions.
AWS should be banned on the moral principle that only human beings ought to
make decisions deliberately to kill or not kill in war. This argument, which has been
developed in its fullest and most sophisticated form by ethicist Wendell Wallach, is
drawn from a view of human moral agency (see Wallach 2015). That is, a machine,
no matter how sophisticated in its programming, cannot replace the presence of
a true moral agent—a human being possessed of a conscience and the faculty of
moral judgment. Only a human being possessing those qualities should make, or is
fully morally capable of making, decisions and carrying them out in war as to when,
where, and who to target with lethal force. A machine making and executing lethal
targeting decisions on its own programming would be, Wallach says, inherently
wrong (Wallach 2013).
This is a difficult argument to address because, as a deontological argument, it
stops with a moral principle that one either accepts or does not accept. One does
not have to be a full-blown consequentialist to believe that practical consequences
matter in this as in other domains of human life. If it were shown to be true that
machines of the future simply did a vastly better job of targeting, with large improvements in minimizing civilian harms or overall destruction on the battlefield, for
example, surely there are other fundamental principles at work here.
One might acknowledge, in other words, that there is something of genuine moral
concern about the intentional decision to take a life and kill in war that diminishes
the dignity of that life, if simply determined by machine and then carried out by
machine. But at some point, many of us would say that the moral value of dignity,
even in being targeted, has to give way if the machine, when it kills or unleashes violent force, clearly uses less violence, kills fewer people, causes less collateral damage,
and so on.
In the foreseeable future, we will be turning over more and more functions with
life or death implications to machines—such as driverless cars or automated robot
surgery technologies—not simply because they are more convenient but because
they prove to be safer—and our basic notions about machine and human decisionmaking will evolve. A world that comes, if it does, to accept self-driving autonomous
cars may also be one in which people expect those technologies to be applied to
weapons and the battlefield as a matter of course, precisely because it regards them
as better (and indeed might find the failure to use them morally objectionable).
The second argument is that AWS should be banned because machine learning
and AI will never reach the point of being capable of satisfying the requirements of
LOAC, law, and ethics. The underlying premise here is that machines will not be
capable, now or in the future, of the requisite intuition, cognition, and judgment to
comply with legal and ethical requirements—especially amid the fog of war. This is
a core conviction held by many who favour a complete ban on autonomous lethal
weapons. They generally deny that, even over time and, indeed, no matter how
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much time or technological progress takes place, machine systems will ever manage to reach the point of satisfying legal and ethical codes and principles applicable
in war. That is because, they believe, no machine system will ever be able to make
appropriate judgments in the infinitely complex situations of warfare, or because
no machine will ever have the capability, through its programming, to exhibit key
elements of human emotion and affect that make human beings irreplaceable in
making lethal decisions on the battlefield—compassion, empathy, and sympathy for
other human beings (Losing Humanity 2012: 4).
These assessments are mostly empirical. Although many who embrace them
might also finally rest upon moral premises denying in principle that a machine has
the moral agency or moral psychology to make lethal decisions, they are framed
here as distinct factual claims about the future evolution of technology. The argument rests on assumptions about how machine technology will actually evolve over
decades or longer or, more frankly, how it will not evolve, as well as beliefs about
the special nature of human beings and their emotional and affective abilities on the
battlefield that no machine could ever exhibit, even over the course of technological
evolution. It is as if to say that no autonomous lethal weapon system could ever pass
an ‘ethical Turing Test’ under which, hypothetically, were a human and a machine
hidden behind a veil, an objective observer could not tell which was which on the
basis of their behaviours.
It is of course quite possible that fully autonomous weapons will never achieve
the ability to meet the required standards, even far into the future. Yet, the radical
scepticism that underlies the argument that they never will is unjustified. Research
into the possibilities of autonomous machine decision-making, not just in weapons
but across many human activities, is only a couple of decades old. No solid basis
exists for such sweeping conclusions about the future of technology.
Moreover, we should not rule out in advance possibilities of positive technological outcomes—including the development of technologies of war that might
reduce risks to civilians by making targeting more precise and firing decisions more
controlled (especially compared to human-soldier failings that are so often exacerbated by fear, panic, vengeance, or other emotions—not to mention the limits of
human senses and cognition).4 It may well be, for instance, that weapons systems
with greater and greater levels of automation can—in some battlefield contexts,
and perhaps more and more over time—reduce misidentification of military targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, or allow for using smaller
quanta of force compared to human decision-making. True, relying on the promise
of computer analytics and artificial intelligence risks pushing us down a slippery
slope, propelled by the future promise of technology to overcome human failings
rather than directly addressing the weaknesses of human moral psychology that
lead to human moral and legal failings on the battlefield.
But the protection of civilians in war and reduction of the harms of war are ‘not
finally about the promotion of human virtue and the suppression of human vice’
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as ends in themselves; human moral psychology is simply a means to those ends,
and so is technology. If technology can further those goals more reliably and lessen
dependence upon human beings with their virtues but also their moral frailties—by
increasing precision; taking humans off the battlefield and reducing the pressures of
human soldiers’ interests in self-preservation; removing from battle the human soldier’s emotions of fear, anger, and desire for revenge; and substituting a more easily
disposable machine—this is to the good. Articulation of the tests of lawfulness that
any autonomous lethal weapon system must ultimately meet helps channel technological development toward those protective ends of the law of armed conflict.
The last argument is that AWS should be banned because machine decisionmaking undermines, or even removes, the possibility of holding anyone accountable in the way and to the extent that an individual human soldier might be held
accountable for unlawful or criminal actions in war. This is an objection particularly salient to those who put significant faith in accountability in war through
mechanisms of individual criminal liability, such as international tribunals or other
judicial mechanisms. One cannot hold a computer criminally liable or punish it.
But to say that the machine’s programmers can be held criminally liable for the
machine’s errors is not satisfactory, either, because although in some cases negligence in design might properly be thought to be so gross and severe as to warrant criminal penalties, the basic concept of civil product liability and design defect
does not correspond to the what the actions would be if done by a human soldier
on the battlefield—war crimes. Therefore, the difficulty is, as many have pointed
out, that somehow human responsibility and accountability for the actions taken by
the machine evaporate and disappear. The soldier in the field cannot be expected
to understand in any serious way the programming of the machine; the designers
and programmers operate on a completely different legal standard; the operational
planners could not know exactly how the machine would perform in the fog of war;
and finally, there might be no human actors left standing to hold accountable.
Putting aside whether there is a role of individual accountability in the use of
AWS, however, it is important to understand that criminal liability is just one of
many mechanisms for promoting and enforcing compliance with the laws of war
(see Anderson and Waxman 2013 for an expanded discussion). Effective adherence
to the law of armed conflict traditionally has come about through mechanisms of
state (or armed party) responsibility. Responsibility on the front end, by a party
to a conflict, is reflected in how a party plans its operations, through its rules of
engagement and the ‘operational law of war.’ Although administrative and judicial
mechanisms aimed at individuals play some important enforcement role, LOAC
has its greatest effect and offers the greatest protections in war when it applies to a
side as a whole and when it is enforced by sanctions and pressures that impose costs
on parties to a conflict that breach their legal responsibilities under LOAC.
Hence, treating criminal liability as the presumptive mechanism of accountability risks blocking the development of machine systems that might, if successful,
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overall reduce actual harms on the battlefield. It would be unfortunate indeed to
sacrifice real-world gains consisting of reduced battlefield harm through machine
systems (assuming there are any such gains) simply in order to satisfy an a priori
principle that there always be a human to hold accountable.

5. The Processes of International
Discussions Over AWS
The Stop Killer Robots campaign, distinguished by its willingness to frame its
call for a ban in ways that explicitly draws on pop culture and sci-fi (no one could
miss the references to The Terminator and Skynet, least of all the journalists who
found the sci-fi framing of Killer Robots irresistible) were able to line up a variety of sympathetic countries to press for discussion of ‘Killer Robots’ in UN and
other international community meetings and forums. Countries had a variety
of reasons for wanting to open up a discussion besides a sincere belief that this
technology needed international regulation beyond existing LOAC—wanting
to slow down the US lead in autonomous military technologies, for example.
But the issue was finally referred over to its logical forum—the mechanisms for
review, drafting, and negotiation provided by the CCW. Periodic review meetings are built into the treaty, and this would be the normal place where such a
discussion would go.
The CCW process began with the convening of several ‘expert meetings’, in which
recognized experts in the field were invited in their individual capacities to open
discussion of the issues. One of these was convened in spring 2014 and a second
in spring 2015. Parallel to this intergovernmental treaty process, interested international NGOs (particularly member organizations of the Stop Killer Robots campaign) sponsored their own meetings, in a process of government/NGO parallel
meetings that has become familiar since the 1990s and the international campaign
to ban landmines.
It is not clear that an actual protocol on AWS will emerge from the CCW discussions, open for signature and ratification by states. We do not want to predict those
kinds of substantive outcomes. However, it is very likely that pushing formalized
international law—a treaty, a protocol—too quickly out of the box will fail, even
with respect to a broadly shared interest among responsible states to ensure that
clearly illegal autonomous weapons do not enter the battlefield. As we previously
wrote with Daniel Reisner, a better approach to the regulation of AWS than quick
promulgation of a new treaty is to:
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reach consensus on some core minimum standards, but at the same time to retain some
flexibility for international standards and requirements to evolve as technology evolves.
Such an instrument is not likely to have compliance traction with States over time unless
it largely codifies standards, practices, protocols and interpretations that States have converged upon over a period of actual development of systems (Anderson, Reisner, and
Waxman 2014: 407).

The goals of legitimate normative regulation of AWS might well require an eventual
treaty regime, and most likely in the form of a new protocol to the CCW convention. But the best way to achieve international rules with real adherence is to allow
an extended period of gestation at the national level, within and informally among
states’ military establishments. Formal mechanisms for negotiating treaties create
their own international political and diplomatic pressures. As we also previously
wrote with Daniel Reisner, the process of convergence among responsible states
is likely to be most successful if ‘it takes place gradually through informal discussions among States, informed by sufficiently transparent and open sharing of relevant information, rather than through formal treaty negotiations that if initiated
too early tend to lock States into rigid political positions’ (Anderson, Reisner, and
Waxman 2014: 407).
In other words, the best path forward is for a group of responsible states at or near
the cutting edge of the relevant technologies—such as the United States, its NATO
and Asian allies—to promote informal discussion about the evolving nature of the
technologies at issue in autonomy, to focus on gradual and granular consideration
of the legal, design, engineering, and strategic issues involved in autonomous weapons, and to foment, through the shared communications and discussions of leading states a set of common understandings, common standards, and proposals for
best practices for such questions. It is slow and it is unapologetically state-centric,
rather than being focused on international institutions or international NGOs and
advocacy groups, but such an approach would adapt better to the evolution of the
technologies involved in automation, autonomy, AI, and robotics.
A gestational period of best practices and informal state exchanges of legal
interpretations over specific technologies and their uses has other advantages with
respect to using process to advance more durable international norms for AWS.
Discussions that are informal and directly among states, yet not part of an international ‘negotiation,’ and initially making no claim to creating new law, allow states
to more freely expound, explore, evolve, and converge with others in their legal
views. Moreover, rapid codification of treaty language, in advance of having actual
designs and technology to address, inevitably favours categorical pronouncements,
sweeping generalities and abstractions. What is needed, however, is not generalities,
but concrete and specific norms emerging from concrete technologies and designs;
LOAC already supplies the necessary general and abstract principles.
Among the many complex, concrete, and deeply technical issues that a gradual
coalescence of best practices and informal norms might address, for example, is
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how legal standards ‘translate into terms of reliability engineering that are “testable, quantifiable, measurable, and reasonable” ’ (Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman
2014: 409, quoting Backstrom and Henderson 2012: 507). Such concrete and often
technical matters (both in law and engineering) are the real issues for elaborating norms to govern AWS, not sweeping statements of first principles with which
LOAC is already properly equipped. That said, however, the ability gradually to
evolve widely shared international norms—norms that are concrete and often technical in nature—for AWS will necessarily depend on leading players, such as the
US and its allies, being willing to see they have strategic interests in greater levels of
transparency than they might otherwise prefer. Shared norms require at least some
shared information.

6. Conclusions and the ‘Meaningful
Human Control’ Standard
This discussion of AWS concludes by leaving the political, diplomatic, and negotiating issues of international treaty processes and returning to issues of regulatory
substance. Discussions in the CCW meetings as well as in academic and policy
forums have recently taken up the idea of a legal requirement of ‘meaningful human
control’ (MHC) with respect to highly automated or autonomous weapon systems
(see Horowitz and Scharre 2015). The idea is undeniably attractive—who would not
want to require that machine weapon systems have appropriate and proper levels
of human control? It is a concept found, for example, in the DOD Directive, where
it is offered as one of the purposes for the special requirements imposed on AWS
(DOD Directive 2012: 2).
There are, however, several reasons to be cautious about embracing MHC. The
first is that the basis on which many parties seem to have embraced MHC as a way
out of conceptual and political difficulties is because it offers strategic ambiguity.
This principle can be read many different ways, and it begs questions of what is
meant by ‘meaningful’ and what is meant by ‘control’. Sometimes strategic ambiguity is a good idea in international politics, as a way of defusing tensions. But much
of the time, strategic ambiguity ends in disappointment. It is not generally a good
idea to embrace treaty phrasing about which the parties hold radically opposed
or at least inconsistent ideas as to what it means. At some point, the contradictions can no longer be elided. This threatens to be the case with MHC—the US can
make itself comfortable with the MHC standard because it says that, of course, its
AWS have the proper amount of MHC; the Stop Killer Robots campaign and its
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sympathetic governments will understand exactly the same language to mean that
no truly autonomous system can ever have MHC; and a not-insignificant number
of militarily advanced countries will urge everyone to embrace it (especially their
rival, the United States) while secretly developing AWS with capabilities that will be
known only when deployed.
Secondly, although some of its proponents view the MHC standard as flowing from LOAC, in some important respects it is quite at odds with the fundamental structure of LOAC, and its core principles of necessity, distinction,
proportionality, and humanity. Each of these four principles is directed to, and
evaluated by, its effects in armed conflict. Necessity authorizes violent hostilities,
but also limits their effects. Distinction authorizes attacks on some persons, but
also limits the effects of attacks, by limiting those who can be directly targeted.
Proportionality authorizes attacks that might foreseeably lead to civilian harm
or deaths, but it also limits the scope of permissible collateral harm. Humanity,
in its LOAC meaning, seeks to relieve the burdens of those trapped in armed
conflict, but it does so by reference to the effects that one action or another has
on those people.
MHC is different. Insofar as its requirements are not already part of the others,
it means obligations that are not finally measured by their effects, but instead by an
insistence on a certain mode of weapons and hostilities. It is not a law of nature,
however, that weapons that put a human being ‘meaningfully’ in control of it, in
some fashion, necessarily do the best job at minimizing battlefield harms. It is not
beyond possibility that at some point, in some circumstances, a machine might do
it better, on its own.
It is not clear at this writing how or even whether the international debate over a
new treaty will proceed; neither is it clear what arguments or concepts might come
to dominate in that debate. Perhaps it will be MHC—or perhaps something else.
As an alternative to MHC, however, we would suggest that debate over standards
or rules for automated or autonomous systems should remain neutral as between
human or machine, and should affirmatively reject any a priori preference for
human over machine.
The principle of humanity is fundamental, but it refers, not to some idea that
humans must operate weapons, but instead to the promotion of means or methods
of warfare that best protect humanity within the lawful bounds of war, irrespective
of whether the means to that end is human or machine or some combination of the
two. Whether to favour an ethical insistence on an element of human control or
to instead to favour strict neutrality as between ‘who’ or ‘what’, to be settled solely
on the basis of effects and who or what performs better in minimizing battlefield
harms: this is an essential debate today over the normative regulation of autonomous weapon systems, and surely not irrelevant to many other debates arising
today over the law and ethics of automation and robotic technologies.5
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Notes
1. See, e.g. Julian E. Barnes, ‘US Launches Drone Strikes in Libya’ (Wall Street Journal, 22
April 2011) A6 (‘Drones have been used for reconnaissance missions from the start of
the conflict, but in recent days, NATO commanders had asked the US to provide armed
Predator strikes.’)
2. For a general and legally thorough introduction to the legal requirements and processes of weapons review in international law, from a US perspective, see Hays Parks,
‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law 55.
3. For example, remarks by Ronald C Arkin in a public panel discussion on AWS, on
(regarding the ability of machine systems gradually to advance in capabilities to make
algorithmic determinations that would conform to LOAC requirements, not as a certainty or impossibility, but instead as a ‘testable hypothesis’), University of Pennsylvania
School of Law, Conference on Autonomous Weapon Systems, November 14, 2014.
4. As the ICRC put it in its 2011 ‘Contemporary Challenges of Armed Conflict’ report,
p. 40: ‘After all, emotion, the loss of colleagues and personal self-interest is not an issue
for a robot and the record of respect for [the law of armed conflict] by human soldiers is
far from perfect, to say the least.’ See also, ‘Out of the Loop,’ p. 249 (‘Although emotions
can restrain humans, it is equally true that they can unleash the basest instincts. From
Rwanda and the Balkans to Darfur and Afghanistan, history is replete with tragic examples of unchecked emotions leading to horrendous suffering’).
5. Readers interested in additional resources on AWS and their legal and ethical considerations are referred to the Center for a New American Security, 20YY Warfare Initiative,
Ethical Autonomy Project, which since 2014 has maintained a running bibliography
on AWS issues from the standpoints of technology, strategy, law, and ethics; website at
http://cnas.org.
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